It's on the topic of abortion. ENJOY!
Pro-Choice vs Pro-Life
Abortion is one of the most well argued ethical topics of this generation. Equally, it is also one of the most sensitive topics. In vague twenty-first century terms as I’ve known it, abortion is the act of “killing” or removing a fetus from the womb before it is born. One controversial aspect those arguing about abortion face is determining whether or when a fetus is considered a person. For the sake of argument, we can assume that a fetus is a person from the moment of conception, and thus we treat the fetus as a person with the right to life, even prior to birth. In the pro-abortion article “A Defense of Abortion”, Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that although abortion is not impermissible, it is not always permissible. For instance, when pregnancy is due to rape or when the mother’s right to life is threatened due to pregnancy, Thomson’s argument for abortion permissibility is sound. She concludes that the mother’s right to the use of her body outweighs the right to life of the fetus, especially when the state of pregnancy is either a threat to her right to life or if the pregnancy was not a direct result of the mother’s voluntary consent to sex. In addition, Thomson states that although abortion is permissible sometimes, she is not arguing the right to secure the death of an unborn child. For example, when Thomson argues for permissibility of abortion due to recreational sex, she states that there are at least some cases in which abortion ought to be impermissible and considered unjust to kill the fetus. However, Thomson still believes that under the premise “the right to life consists not in the right not to be killed, but rather in the right not to be killed unjustly” that abortion as a result of recreational sex can still be considered permissible, given the right circumstances. We will dissect this premise and attempt to exploit why abortion as a result of recreational sex should ultimately be considered unjust killing of a fetus.
“Suppose a woman voluntarily indulges in intercourse, knowing of the chance it will issue in pregnancy, and then she does become pregnant; is she not in part responsible for the presence, in fact the very existence, of the unborn person inside of her?” Intuition tells us that yes, if a mother willingly puts her rights to her body at risk, then whatever consequences result from that risk are her responsibility as well, because she voluntary indulged in that risk. Thomson even agrees with this to some extent, by using her example of the two brothers and the box of chocolates; which goes like this:
Suppose a boy and his small brother are jointly given a box of chocolates for Christmas. If the other boy takes the box and refuses to give his brother any of the chocolates, he is unjust to him, for the brother has been given a right to half of them.
By analogy, the box of chocolates is the mother’s body, and now the right to this box is jointly shared by two people (the two brothers are now the mother and fetus). And if one person were to take ownership of the entire box/body, Thomson believes it would be unjust toward the person whose rights to the box/body were now taken away.
Although Thomson agrees that partial responsibility of the pregnancy does not permit abortion in the situation analogous to the brothers and box of chocolates, she claims there are a multitude of examples she can think of (all varying in tiny details, but all include the mother’s partial responsibility of pregnancy) in which partial responsibility for a consequence does not mean the consequence is deserved; rather the consequence does not deserved to be dealt with. For example, Thomson argues that recreational sex is something many people cannot live without. This is a fair statement, and I believe most people today (including myself) would find this statement to be true. So then, recreational sex which leads to pregnancy, and thus leads to abortion, should not be considered impermissible if one believes an act to be too pleasurable and necessary to continue life without. Furthermore, we assume that the ability to abstain from sex would be irrational in this case. Thomson uses the following example of “people-seeds” to support her argument:
Say you enjoy the pure bliss and pleasure of fresh air blowing through your house windows that you cannot go through life with your windows shut forever. Now say outside the house people-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take root in your carpets or upholstery. You don’t want children, so you fix up your windows with the best possible protection money can buy. As can happen however, and on very, very rare occasions does happen, one of the protective tools is defective; and a seed drifts in and takes root. Does the person-plant who now develops have a right to the use of your house?
Thomson says that in this case, it only seems reasonable that you are allowed to exterminate the unwanted people-seeds that breach your expensive protection. She believes that since you never wanted people-seeds, that you simply cannot go through life without the pleasure of fresh air, and the fact that you tried every best next preventative measure to avoid people-seeds entering your home through the windows, that exterminating the seeds (and thus aborting an unwanted fetus due to well protected recreational sex) is not considered unjust and therefore permissible. It is important to note that in the case of partial responsibility of a fetus, Thomson believes there are certain cases in which abortion is permissible (people-seeds) and when abortion is impermissible (brothers and box of chocolates). Meanwhile, I argue that if a mother is partially responsible for the fetus, aborting that fetus (assuming it does not threaten the mother’s life) should be considered unjust killing in every case; due to the fact that she was at least partially responsible for it existence.
My problem is how Thomson defines “partial responsibility.” What does partial responsibility entail? In a positive sense, if you were partially responsible for something that is virtuous, then you should deserve at least partial credit or recognition of that virtuous act and at least part of the reward that results from it. Why? Because you are partially responsible for that act. Should this not work for the negative sense? If you were partially responsible for something that is bad, then you deserve at least partial blame, and hence deserve at least part of the consequences that result because of it. At the very least, you do not deserve to be completely excused from the blame nor the consequence, but maybe at the very least partially excused. I now present my first counter premise, in that: by being partially responsible for an act, you then have the right to partial consequence of that act (good or bad). By the same logic you have the right to partial excuse of that consequence, because you are only partially responsible.
So in the case of pregnancy as a consequence due to recreational sex, it would be unfair to say that the mother deserves full responsibility of the pregnancy if she’s only partly responsible for it as a consequence. Unfortunately, the problem with being partially excused of a pregnancy is that there is no such possibility. There’s no way for a mother to take half of the pregnancy, and the father take the other half. This leads to my second premise: that the right to life outweighs the right to partial consequences. It seems unjust that the mother takes full responsibility of a consequence she’s only partially responsible for. On the same token, it seems even more unjust to kill a person whose existence is a direct consequence of the mother’s voluntary involvement in recreational sex. Doing so would be unjust, because the right to life of the fetus is the responsibility of the mother, and in this case, she’s at least partially responsible for it. Therefore, the right to life of the fetus outweighs the mother’s right to endure half of the pregnancy as a consequence.
Some might argue that the mother’s underlying right to her body overpowers the right to life of the fetus. But I’d then argue that if the mother voluntarily uses her body for the enjoyment of recreational sex (which she has the right to), and knowing that she can be partially responsible for the fetus’ existence (and thus its right to life); she then has a right to part of the consequences of recreational sex (whatever it may be). This right is a direct result of how the woman uses the rights to her body, and as we just stated, the right to life outweighs the mother’s right to partial consequences. Simply because the mother does not want the entire consequence doesn’t mean she has the right to excuse herself from any consequence at all, especially if she voluntarily puts herself in a situation that can lead to partial consequence.
The consequence of recreational sex is unique, in that pregnancy requires the use of the mother’s bodily resources. Since pregnancy is the consequence of recreational sex, even if it protrudes the mother’s right to her body, the mother is still at least partially responsible for that consequence. As we just concluded, the fetus’ right to life outweighs your right to partial excuse from the other half of this consequence (which isn’t even possible to divide in the first place). We then conclude that if you were to kill the fetus as a result of unplanned pregnancy due to recreational sex, you would be killing the fetus unjustly because its right to life outweighs your right to partial consequences of recreational sex.
